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JOAN MACLEOD HEMINWAY *
Does Sarbanes-Oxley Foster the Existence of
Ethical Executive Role Models
in the Corporation?
THE ACHIEVEMENT OF GOOD CORPORATE GOVERNANCE has been a major U.S. and
international policy objective in the twenty-first century. In the past few years, both
governmental and nongovernmental organizations have proposed, promoted, or
adopted measures intended to achieve this objective.' Self-regulatory organizations
and standard-setting bodies also have jumped on the bandwagon, as legally com-
pelled actors and as volunteer rule makers.' The flagship example of these efforts is
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attending research forums sponsored by The University of Tennessee Corporate Governance Center and the
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1. See, e.g., Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 11, 15, 18, 28, and 29 U.S.C.); Luca Enriques, Bad Apples, Bad Oranges: A Comment from
Old Europe on Post-Enron Corporate Governance Reforms, 38 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 911, 916-26 (2003) (survey-
ing corporate governance reforms in the European Union, France, Germany, Italy, and the United Kingdom);
CAL. PUB. EMPLOYEES' RET. SYS., CORE PRINCIPLES OP ACCOUNTABLE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE (2007), availa-
ble at http://www.calpers-governance.org/principles/domestic/us/page01.asp; Swiss Bus. FED'N, SWISS CODE
OF BEST PRACTICES FOR CORPORATE GOVERNANCE (2002), available at http://www.ecgi.org/codes/code.php?
code id= 115.
2. See, e.g., Lawrence A. Cunningham, A New Product for the State Corporation Law Market: Audit Com-
mittee Certifications, I BERKELEY Bus. L.J. 327, 336-50 (2004) (highlighting aspects of the Public Company
Accounting Oversight Board's standard-setting role in changing corporate governance); Robert B. Thompson,
Corporate Federalism in the Administrative State: The SEC's Discretion to Move the Line Between the State and
Federal Realms of Corporate Governance, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1143, 1180-86 (2007) (noting the interactive
role of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission and stock exchanges in changing corporate governance);
Robert B. Thompson, Delaware, The Feds, and the Stock Exchange: Challenges to the First State as First in
Corporate Law, 29 DEL. J. CORP. L. 779, 792-97 (2004) (describing, among other things, the stock exchanges
role as "alternative law-givers" in the area of corporate governance); ASX LTD. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
COUNCIL, PRINCIPLES OF GOOD CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND BEST PRACTICE RECOMMENDATIONS (2003),
available at http://www.shareholder.com/visitors/dynamicdoc/document.cfm?documentid=364&companyid=
asx.
JOURNAL OF BUSINESS & TECHNOLOGY LAW
DOES SARBANES-OXLEY FOSTER ETHICAL EXECUTIVE ROLE MODELS?
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 ("Sarbanes-Oxley" or the "Act"), U.S. federal legis-
lation enhancing the corporate governance regulation of public companies.'
What does it take to achieve good corporate governance? Most agree that rules
(whether in the form of principles or standards), even if necessary, are not suffi-
cient to accomplish the task.4 To that point, a few months after Sarbanes-Oxley was
signed into law, Stuart C. Gilman (then the president of the Ethics Resource Center
(ERC), a non-profit organization located in Washington D.C.) made the following
relevant observations in testimony before the Advisory Group on Federal Sentenc-
ing Guidelines for Organizations.
Much of the recent conversation regarding organizational leadership has
centered on business scandals and the most appropriate way to avoid similar
circumstances in the future .... this response is most evident in the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act of 2002. This legislation requires executive leadership to attest to the
integrity of their organizations' financial reporting and overall operations.
Such an outcome presumes an effective system of monitoring and oversight of
the business conduct of the organization .... Attesting to fiscal integrity is only
possible if monitoring and oversight are integrated into the systems and prac-
tices at all levels of the organization - this includes formal systems, the informal
operating norms and the culture as understood by all employees.
To do that requires leadership. An executive can comply with Sarbanes-
Oxley and attest to the integrity of his or her organization only to the extent
that he or she has set a tone for organizational integrity at the top.
One of the most important ways this can be accomplished by a leader is by
serving as a role model. A leader's behavior has the ability to shape employees'
perceptions of what constitutes acceptable ethical behavior, as well as employ-
ees' views of the leader him or herself In other words, leadership translates
from the "top-down," the conduct of the superiors influencing the actions of the
subordinates.
If ethical behavior is to be integrated throughout an entire organization, no
matter the size, those who are seen as leaders must proactively encourage ethi-
cal behavior and facilitate (legitimize) ethical dialogue. When they do, their
actions help shape and maintain an ethical culture.5
3. Only public companies, which consist of issuers with a class of securities registered under section 12 of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78(l) (2000 & Supp. V 2004), are governed under Sarbanes-
Oxley.
4. In the words of one prominent legal scholar, "[law is built on broad voluntary compliance. No matter
how many laws are on the books .... if the majority or leadership of the population does not obey the law, law
is likely to remain a dead letter." TAMAR FRANKEL, TRUST AND HONESTY: AMERICA'S BUSINESS CULTURE AT A
CROSSROAD 190 (2006).
5. Dr. Stuart C. Gilman, President, Ethics Resource Center, Testimony to the Advisory Group on Federal
Sentencing Guidelines for Organizations (Nov. 14, 2002), available at http://www.ussc.gov/corp/ph Il_-02/t_
SGilman.pdf. Dr. Gilman's testimony was offered in the wake of Sarbanes-Oxley. The U.S. Sentencing Com-
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Dr. Gilman's statements intuitively seem correct; to some, they may even seem
obvious. In fact, consonant comments have been echoed by others before and after
the enactment of Sarbanes-Oxley.6 The creation and maintenance of integrity and
good governance within a firm requires the active and ongoing involvement of
engaged, ethical corporate leaders. In a 2005 presentation before the United Na-
tions, one corporate leader offered his consistent views.
Good Corporate Governance does not only mean to apply rules and to meet
requirements. Good Corporate Governance is definitely more than that. Al-
though there is no widely accepted definition or model of Corporate Govern-
ance, good Corporate Governance can only be achieved with top
representatives as role models, demonstrating credibility and integrity on a
daily basis. These are the determining elements that constitute sustainability in
Corporate Governance.7
Yet, this rhetoric begs for further thought and analysis. Among other things, if
compliance with, or the efficacy of, Sarbanes-Oxley and other corporate govern-
ance initiatives requires that executives (or other firm leaders) be good ethical' role
models, then it is important to ask whether Sarbanes-Oxley-or any other attribute
mission in fact passed revisions to the Federal Sentencing Guidelines that relate to the promotion of ethical
corporate cultures and the encouragement of ethical and legal behavior in the corporation. U.S. SENTENCING
GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8B2.1 (2004); see also Gary M. Brown, Changing Models in Corporate Governance-
Implications of the US Sarbanes-Oxley Act, in CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN CONTEXT: CORPORATIONS, STATES,
AND MARKETS IN EUROPE, JAPAN, AND THE US 143, 159-61 (Klaus J. Hopt et al. eds., 2005); David Hess et al.,
The 2004 Amendments to the Federal Sentencing Guidelines and their Implicit Call for a Symbiotic Integration of
Business Ethics, II FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 725 (2006).
6. See, e.g., FRANKLIN C. ASHBY, REVITALIZE YOUR CORPORATE CULTURE 82, 88 (1999) (listing "A Focus
on Building Role Models-Not Just Leaders" as one of "The Ten Identifying Features of a Great Organizational
Culture"); FRANKEL, supra note 4, at 191 ("[Wlhat most determine corporate culture are the attitude and
signals of top management-sometimes only one or two people at the head of the corporate pyramid. They set
the tone and direction of the organization. In corporations, the signals of top management are closely watched
and followed."); Narayana N.R. Murthy, Chairman of the Bd., Infosys Techs. Ltd., Remarks at the Robert P.
Maxon Lecture at George Washington Univ.: Good Corporate Governance-A Checklist or a Mindset? (Feb. 6,
2006) ("While SOX and other initiatives have created a good framework for better governance, I do believe that
such focus on rules-based regulation can only succeed if we create a mindset for decency, honesty and respecta-
bility among corporate leaders.").
7. Felix Horber, Presentation at the United Nations: Corporate Governance--Implementation, Chal-
lenges, and Trends (Feb. 9, 2005), available at http://www.unece.org/ie/wp8/documents/corpgov/horbercorp
gov.pdf; see also Steven M. Mintz, Corporate Governance in an International Context: Legal Systems, Financing
Patterns and Cultural Variables, 13 CORP. GOVERNANCE 582, 584 (2005) ("To be effective, corporate governance
principles must be part of the culture of an organisation .... Once the board of directors and executive officers
have agreed on the principles, their role as corporate leaders is to set the appropriate ethical tone for the
company and communicate these principles throughout the organisation.").
8. Although ethics often is a subject of discussion and analysis, the concept often goes undefined. For
purposes of this essay, a person is ethical if that person acts in accordance with a group of moral principles-
notions of right and wrong. For a brief summary of various conceptions of ethics, see Debra Moss Curtis,
Everything I Wanted To Know About Teaching Law School I Learned From Being a Kindergarten Teacher: Ethics in
the Law School Classroom, 2006 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 455, 458-60.
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of existing corporate governance regulation-in fact promotes or permits the pro-
duction or preservation of ethical role models in the executive ranks of public com-
panies. An absence of support for ethical role models in public companies may
signal the failure of broad-based federal corporate governance initiatives like
Sarbanes-Oxley.
This Article assumes that role models-ethical roles models-may be important
to the maintenance of good corporate governance (in general) and the success of
Sarbanes-Oxley as a corporate governance initiative (in specific). In other words,
this Article assumes that the rhetoric quoted and cited above has a basis in reality.
(Although empirical work should be done to directly support this assumption, that
empirical work must wait for another day.) With the noted assumptions in mind,
this Article preliminarily analyzes whether Sarbanes-Oxley may encourage or dis-
courage the existence of ethical role models in the corporation.
The preliminary analysis presented here proceeds in three further parts. First, in
Part I, the Article briefly surveys social sciences literature on ethical role models.
This Part focuses on both defining what an ethical role model is and identifying the
conditions for creating and maintaining ethical role models in the corporation.
Then, in Part II, the Article highlights certain relevant provisions from Sarbanes-
Oxley that influence ethical behavior in the executive ranks and, therefore, may
have an effect on role model creation and maintenance. Finally, the Article con-
cludes in Part III by briefly summarizing and synthesizing the information included
in Parts I and II.
I. THE CREATION AND MAINTENANCE OF ETHICAL ROLE MODELS
A. The Concept of an Ethical Role Model
The term "role model" apparently was coined by Robert King Merton more than 50
years ago.' He wrote: "The concept of role model ... [denotes] a . . . limited
identification with an individual in ... one or a selected few of his roles."'" Since
that time, others have ventured forth with their own definitions. For example, a
current social sciences dictionary defines role models as "persons who represent
broader sets of social values and provide ideal enactments of those values."" The
study of role modeling spans the social sciences, from sociology to psychology to
business management. "Role modeling in general is an aspect of social learning." 2
Despite the fact that the concept of a role model is a half-century old, we have
much to learn about role models in general and ethical role models in particular.
9. ROBERT K. MERTON, SOCIAL THEORY AND SOCIAL STRUCTURE 302-03 (rev. ed. 1957).
10. Id. at 302--03. Role models represent a narrow conception of "reference individuals;" a "person who
identifies himself with a reference individual will seek to approximate the behavior and values of that individ-
ual in his several roles." Id. at 302.
11. DICTIONARY OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCEs 419 (Craig Calhoun ed., 2002).
12. Gary R. Weaver, Linda Klebe Treviflo & Bradley Agle, "Somebody I Look Up To:" Ethical Role Models in
Organizations, 34 ORG. DYNAMICS 313, 329 (2005).
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Certain things, however, are relatively clear. In a paper published in 2005, for ex-
ample, three researchers identified "four categories of attitudes and behaviors...
along with a related foundation of contextual factors relevant to identifying some-
one as an ethical role model."' 3 These attitudes and behaviors include:
* Interpersonal Behaviors;' 4
* Ethical Actions and Expectations for Self;' 5
* Fairness with Others; 6 and
* Articulating Ethical Standards for Others. 7
The specific findings of these researchers regarding the component attributes un-
derlying these four principal attitudes and behaviors are rich and detailed.
* In terms of "[i]nterpersonal behaviors," an ethical role model exhibits "care,
concern and compassion," "support[s] and take[s] responsibility for other[s],"
"[vialues and maintains relationships," is "[h]ard working and helpful,"
"[a]ccentuates the positive," and "[a]ccepts others' failures."'"
* An ethical role model's "[e]thical action and expectation for self" comprise
"[h]onesty," "[t]rustworthiness," "[i]ntegrity," and "[h]umility," and, along the
same lines, an ethical role model holds himself or herself "to high ethical stan-
dards," is "[c]onsistently ethical in public and private life," is "[s]elf-sacrificial,"
and "[a]ccepts responsibility for, and [is] open about, [his or her] own ethical
failings."' 9
* An ethical role model's manifestations of"[f]airness with others" include equi-
tably distributing resources, being "[o]pen to and solicitous of input," treating
people with "[e]qual respect," and "[o]ffer[ing] explanations of decisions."2
* As an articulator of ethical standards, an ethical role model has an
"[ulncompromising, consistent ethical vision," "[c]ommunicates high ethical
standards," "[hiolds others ethically accountable," "[pluts ethics above per-
sonal/company interests," and takes a "[l]ong-term, multiple stakeholder
perspective."'"
These personal attributes exist in a context that also has certain identifiable charac-
teristics. An ethical role model engages in "[f] requent interactions," is "[riespected
by others," and is not necessarily a business success. 2 These research observations
indicate that ethical role modeling requires both personal attributes and actions
consistent with those attributes.23
13. Id. at 315.
14. Id. at 315-17.
15. Id. at 318-20.
16. Id. at 320-21.
17. Id. at 321-23.
18. Id. at 316-17.
19. Id. at 316, 318-20.
20. Id. at 316, 320-21.
21. Id. at 316, 321-23.
22. Id. at 316, 323-24.
23. Id. at 318 ("Ethical role models act ethically, and have high ethical expectations for themselves.").
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Ethical role models may be distinguished from ethical mentors. Although both
role models and mentors convey information about best practices, role modeling is
comprised of relationships that (for the most part) are not entered into con-
sciously, whereas mentoring typically is a voluntary association between or among
people.2" This may mean that role models are more likely to be created in an envi-
ronment conducive to the establishment of the requisite actions and relationships
than through institutionally mandated actions and relationships.
Ethical role models also are distinguishable from ethical leaders. "[A]lthough
ethical role modeling is closely related to ethical leadership, they are not the same
thing."25 Ethical role models and ethical leaders may (and undoubtedly do) share
leadership-type attributes and actions, but it takes more than being an ethical
leader to be an ethical role model. Ethical role modeling requires a high-level, per-
vasive transparency. Specifically, an ethical role model must be transparent to
those around him or her in a way that honestly transmits not only his or her own
high standards of behavior and the similarly high standards by which all should
abide, but also his or her own faults and failures to meet these standards.26
Recent research from the ERC Fellows Program supports the notion that being
perceived as an ethical role model requires more than simply being an ethical
person. Leaders must make visible the ethical challenges they face and the ethi-
cal standards they apply to any given situation .... ethical leaders can fail in
the role of being an ethical role model-simply by failing to make the ethical
issues explicit.27
It is not surprising, then, that humility also is an identified characteristic of an
ethical role model, making role models more compelling (perhaps), but hard to
identify.2"
We cannot say much more about ethical role models based on the existing litera-
ture. Undoubtedly, more work should be done to isolate the concept more clearly.
Yet, as little as we know about ethical role models overall, we know significantly less
about the part they play in creating and maintaining ethical organizational struc-
tures and activities, although we sense that ethical role models can contribute posi-
tively to those efforts.29 It is important that this connection also be more closely
analyzed. In any event, the current state of research on the elements and function
of ethical role modeling is summarized well in the following quote.
24. Id. at 314.
25. Id. at 324.
26. Id. at 324-25.
27. Gilman, supra note 5 (endnotes omitted).
28. See Weaver, Trevifio & Agle, supra note 12, at 326.
29. See, e.g., id. at 314, 327-28.
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Modeling is a well-documented means of transmitting values, attitudes, and
behaviors in all types of settings, including work. People learn much of what
they know not through direct experience, but by observing the behavior of
others. In the modeling process, people identify with another person, and inter-
nalize the role model's values, behaviors, or attitudes. In effect, people form a
mental picture of how a role model acts in various situations, and then apply
that image to the varied and novel situations they themselves encounter. In
effect, people use role models to help define themselves and guide their own
behavior. When it comes to ethical behavior at work, modeling is likely a pow-
erful learning tool. Yet despite this, we know little about role modeling and how
it works in the ethics arena.3"
B. Conditions Conducive to the Establishment and Continued Existence of Ethical
Role Models in the Corporation
So, a person must (at a minimum) be ethical and humble and act ethically in a
public and transparent manner in order to be an ethical role model." Ethical na-
ture and humility, as well as other individual attributes, are character traits inher-
ent in or socialized into an individual over time, and they may have a role in
dictating human activity. 2 However, the actions of individuals also are heavily in-
fluenced by environment. In fact, it has been observed that "the primary mo-
tivators of individual behavior are the situational constraints faced by the
individual."3 How, then, may a rule (legal or other), organizational structure, or
broader social context create an environment in which an ethical, humble person is
employed and retained by a corporation and is permitted-even encouraged-to
behave as an ethical role model?
There is no simple legal or other litmus test that enables a corporation to gauge
the ethics or humility of a job applicant or employee.34 An ethical, humble corpo-
30. Id. at 314.
31. I recognize that I have measurably shortened the earlier described characteristics of a role model for
the sake of simplicity and ease of presentation, although I endeavored to retain the essence of those characteris-
tics. For the more fulsome description, see supra notes 18-28 and accompanying text.
32. See Richard Lavoie, Subverting the Rule of Law: The Judiciary's Role in Fostering Unethical Behavior, 75
U. COLO. L. REV. 115, 127 (2004) ("For a character trait to viably serve this function, it must (1) consistently
come into play in a wide variety of divergent factual situations; (2) recur over time; and (3) significantly
influence behavior.").
33. Id. at 121. Professor Lavoie further notes that "a person's internal character has little to do with
whether she behaves ethically, but external factors, like her perception of the risk of having her unethical
behavior discovered and censured, have a marked effect on her behavior." Id. at 121-22; see also Lynne L.
Dallas, A Preliminary Inquiry into the Responsibility of Corporations and their Officers and Directors for Corporate
Climate: The Psychology of Enron's Demise, 35 RUTGERS L.J. 1 (2003) (describing in detail the role of social
context in ethical corporate behavior and decision making and ways to evaluate and create a positive social
context for the establishment of an ethical corporate climate).
34. See Jeffrey L. Seglin, Will More Rules Yield Better Corporate Behavior?, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 17, 2002, § 3,
at 4 ("while it might be possible to screen prospective executives for past successes in managing corporate
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rate leader, however, may be more likely to attract ethical, humble employees.3"
Similarly, the visible, transparent transmission of ethical values is hard to measure
in an interview or periodic employee evaluation. Corporations should, of course,
be alert to signs that these positive personal characteristics-and the capacity for
the transmission of values to others through action-exist in their job applicants
and employees.36 However, because more is known about incentives to ethical con-
duct created by law and social context, the remainder of this Part focuses on the
encouragement of ethical behavior in the corporation.
Law is inextricably intertwined with society.37 Among other things, law and so-
cial context function together to represent and influence the ethical, humble, trans-
parent behavior necessary for the creation and maintenance of role models.
The law is created within the context of a particular society and must reflect
the moral values of that society if it is to be obeyed and respected. Similarly,
what is considered moral by a society is influenced by what is legally permitted.
If the law consciously rejects society's cultural feedback, then unacceptable
levels of unethical behavior will result.3"
Although it is often said that one cannot legislate ethics, law may have multiple
roles in the encouragement of ethical behavior in a way that supports the develop-
ment and sustained existence of ethical role models. Specifically, law can provide
situational constraints on individuals by indicating what is unethical and ethical,
punishing behavior that is unethical, or creating an environment in which ethical
behavior is welcomed and rewarded.39 Yet, law may not always reinforce desired
behaviors; law has a social context and a social construction.4" Among other things,
"[for the law to serve as an effective constraint on behavior, the members of the
growth or achieving favorable stock performance, how do you measure for something as apparently subjective
as integrity?").
35. See Dallas, supra note 33, at 42.
36. See id. ("When an outsider is being considered for a leadership position, those doing the considering
should learn as much as possible about how that person has behaved in the past.").
37. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAw 197, 199 (1961) ("[Tjhe existence of a legal system is a social
phenomenon" and "[tihe law of every modern state shows at a thousand points the influence of both the
accepted social morality and wider moral ideals.").
38. Lavoie, supra note 32, at 118; see also HART, supra note 37, at 181 ("[I]t cannot seriously be disputed
that the development of law, at all times and places, has in fact been profoundly influenced... by the conven-
tional morality and ideals of particular social groups .... ).
39. See Hess et al., supra note 5, at 758-64; Lavoie, supra note 32, at 135; see also Scott Harshbarger &
Goutam U. Jois, Looking Back and Looking Forward: Sarbanes-Oxley and the Future of Corporate Governance, 40
AKRON L. REV. 1, 45 (2007) ("[A] strong regulatory baseline .... can provide business leaders with the
protection they need to be ethical in a competitive market.").
40. See, e.g., HART, supra note 37, at 199 (noting that even the "liability for both civil and criminal wrongs
may be adjusted to prevailing views of moral responsibility"); Frederick Schauer, The Social Construction of the
Concept of Law: A Reply to Julie Dickson, 25 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 493, 496 (2005).
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society must respect the substance of the laws and the process by which they are
created and enforced." 4 1
Accordingly, law alone is not enough to fashion ethical role models from ethical
people and encourage the long-term, consistent, open behaviors that promote and
perpetuate the existence of ethical role models. Positive social context (interactions
between and among stakeholders that can be, but are not always, instigated or
facilitated by legal rules) also plays a key role. "[T]he relationship between regula-
tors, corporate leaders, and professionals can and should be directed to foster an
ethical, competitive corporate culture."" Culture impacts ethical behavior and,
therefore, the existence of role models.
Corporations are creatures of law; they are organized, structured, and operated
within the parameters of law, principally under rules provided by state corporate
law and (especially but not exclusively as to public companies) federal securities
law.43 Apart from establishing basic governance and operating structures and roles,
these laws largely do two things relevant to ethical role modeling: identify illegal
and legal behavior; and prescribe punishment (criminal and civil) for those who
behave illegally." In these ways, law influences unethical and ethical behavior in the
corporation.
Society (both outside and inside the corporation) also constrains corporate ac-
tivities. Social rebuke for unethical behavior is not uncommon. Moreover, a corpo-
ration's adoption of legally permissible governance and operating structures
provides social context for the behavior of the corporation's agents in conducting
the corporation's business. These structures can impact ethical behavior in the cor-
poration by providing operational constraints on unethical behavior or organiza-
tional impetus for ethical behavior-by helping to frame a corporate culture.
Together with law, social context impacts the behavior of corporate agents.
Unethical corporate action is not the result of "evil" executives. Unethical activ-
ities arise because the circumstances of the situation fail to constrain the behav-
ior. Two key constraints in this regard are (1) the action's legality; and (2) the
risk of group censure .... However, . .. [slociety must also create and reinforce
social constraints aimed at minimizing unethical behavior.45
Law, then, may promote role modeling in the corporation both by defining un-
ethical conduct as illegal and by encouraging the development of a supportive so-
cial context outside and inside the corporation-a context that channels corporate
agents toward genuine, consistent, transparent ethical behavior.
41. Lavoie, supra note 32, at 138.
42. Harshbarger & Jois, supra note 39, at 35.
43. Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 479 (1977) ("'Corporations are creatures of state law ..
(quoting Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 84 (1975)).
44. See HART, supra note 37, at 27.
45. Lavoie, supra note 32, at 169-70 (footnotes omitted).
VOL. 3 NO. 2 2008
DOES SARBANES-OXLEY FOSTER ETHICAL EXECUTIVE ROLE MODELS?
However, law is not the only influence on social context. The forces that com-
prise and impact society are complex. Part of the complexity comes from an inabil-
ity to define the concept of society as it operates in specific circumstances: society
may be construed broadly or narrowly, depending on defined context.46
Corporate society is a microcosm of society as a whole. An individual employee
interacts with different groups of people during different corporate activities. Each
interaction provides and builds a social context for the individual employee's be-
havior. Combined, these interactions create a corporate culture,47 a way of life in
the corporation that reflects the corporation's ethical climate. 4' To change the
overall tenor of these social interactions, a corporation must change its overall cul-
ture." Creating or changing corporate culture is time-intensive and tricky.5"
46. Merriam Webster's definition of society includes "a community, nation, or broad grouping of people
having common traditions, institutions, and collective activities and interest" as well as "a part of a community
that is a unit distinguishable by particular aims or standards of living or conduct : a social circle or a group of
social circles having a clearly marked identity." MERRIAM WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 1115 (10th ed.
1996). Therefore, one society can contain numerous other societies within it. For example, there can be both a
national society defined by citizenship of a particular nation, while multiple sub-societies consisting of different
religious or ethnic similarities exist within the national society.
47. While corporate culture is somewhat ill-defined, it is a legally recognized concept. See Tamar Frankel,
Using the Sarbanes-Oxley Act to Reward Honest Corporations, 62 Bus. LAW. 161, 163-65 (2006); see also LYNNE
L. DALLAS, LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY: A SOCIOECONOMIC APPROACH 565 (2005) ("Corporate culture is defined
as a 'complex set of common beliefs and expectations held by members of the organization,' which are based
on shared values, assumptions, attitudes and norms.") (citing Vicky Arnold & James C. Lampe, Understanding
the Factors Underlying Ethical Organizations: Enabling Continuous Ethical Improvement, 15 J. APPLIED Bus. RES.
1, 2 (1999)); Patricia S. Abril & Ann Morales Olazibal, The Locus of Corporate Scienter, 2006 COLUM. Bus. L.
REv. 81, 128 ("'Corporate culture' is defined in broad terms that include informal or implicit conduct and
practices (including sub rosa encouragement), as well as stated policies and formal rules: 'Corporate culture' is
an attitude, policy, rule, course of conduct or practice existing within the body corporate generally or within
the area of the body corporate in which the relevant activities take place.'") (citing MODEL CRIMINAL CODE
§ 501.2 (Crim. Law Officers Comm. of the Standing Comm. of the Atty's-Gen. 1992) (Austl.)); Victor Fleischer,
Options Backdating, Tax Shelters, and Corporate Culture, 26 VA. TAX REV. 1031, 1046 (2007) ("Corporate culture
may be defined as the shared beliefs and values of the members of a firm. Or, to put it more concretely,
corporate culture is 'the way we do things around here."').
48. In distinguishing between corporate culture and ethical climate, one prominent legal scholar offers the
following explanation.
Corporate culture is defined as a "complex set of common beliefs and expectations held by members
of the organization," which are based on shared values, assumptions, attitudes and norms. The cor-
poration's ethical climate refers to the ethical meaning attached by employees to organizational poli-
cies, practices, and procedures. These policies, practices, and procedures influence moral awareness,
the criteria used in decision-making, whether morals will have priority over other values, and moral
behavior. Important to ascertaining corporate culture are the employees' perceptions of the corpora-
tion's values - as reflected by the corporation's mission statement and code of ethics, the criteria for
business decisions, the words and actions of leaders, the handling of conflicts of interest, the reward
system, the guidance provided to employees concerning dealing with ethical issues, and the monitor-
ing system.
Dallas, supra note 33, at 3.
49. See Frankel, supra note 47, at 164-65.
50. Id. at 165 ("Changing corporate culture and the processes that comprise it takes time and great
effort.").
JOURNAL OF BUSINESS & TECHNOLOGY LAW
JOAN MACLEOD HEMINWAY
Creating or changing the ethical components of culture in a corporation is ex-
ceedingly difficult because it typically involves a top-down change in corporate in-
teractions with buy-in at all levels of corporate operations. Although the behavior
of the chief executive, operating, financial, and accounting officers of a corporation
often has a formative role in establishing an ethical corporate tone,51 culture crea-
tion requires that all corporate decision making flow from a core set of common
ethical principles consistently and openly observed in practice by corporate man-
agement at all levels.5 2 "[I]n successful companies, the entire organization lived the
core purpose every day."5 3 Perhaps more specifically, in terms of corporate leader-
ship, "[e]xecutives and directors must be role models whose behavior mirrors the
company's code of ethics. And they must act on what they say. After all, ethics and
values are matters of the feet and the heart, not just matters of the mouth.
5 4
II. SARBANES-OXLEY AND ETHICS IN THE CORPORATION
Although Sarbanes-Oxley does not expressly provide for the creation of ethical role
models in the corporation (as a statutory purpose or otherwise), the prevention of
unethical corporate behavior is one of the act's implicit purposes. Sarbanes-Oxley
was enacted (in the wake of revelations of corporate fraud just after the turn of the
century) "[t]o protect investors by improving the accuracy and reliability of corpo-
rate disclosures made pursuant to the securities laws, and for other purposes." 5
The "other purposes" referenced in this introduction to Sarbanes-Oxley are vast.
The operative coverage of the Act includes disclosure regulation, conduct regula-
tion (including the regulation of corporate governance practices), civil procedure
rules, civil and criminal penalties, and more.56 The substantive breadth and depth
51. See Jayne W. Barnard, Reintegrative Shaming In Corporate Sentencing, 72 S. CAL. L. REV. 959, 975-80
(1999).
52. Weaver, Trevifho & Agle, supra note 12, at 314 ("Research studies ... have demonstrated the impor-
tance of top management commitment in fostering ethical business practices within an organization. But em-
ployees often are influenced most by those closest to them-the people they work with every day."); O.C.
Ferrell & Linda Ferrell, Developing a Framework for a College of Business: Business Ethics Initiative (n.d.)
(unpublished manuscript, available at http://www.e-businessethics.com/TeachingResources/DevelopFrame
work.pdf) ("If leaders do not actively serve as role models for the organization's core values, then those values
become nothing more than 'lip service.' . . . Leaders whose decisions and actions are contrary to the firm's
values, send a signal that the firm's values are trivial or irrelevant .... On the other hand, when leaders model
the firm's core values at every turn, the results can be powerful."); Joseph G. Sepesy, Establishing an Effective
Ethics Office: One Company's Experience in the Post-Enron Era, MICH. B.J., Sept. 2006, at 34, 37-38 (quoting a
major corporate CEO espousing this view).
53. R. Edward Freeman, Create a New Story About Business: We Have a Unique Moment to Make a Lasting
Difference in Corporate Practice. This is a Moment We Must Seize, DIRS. & Bos., Mar. 22, 2005, at 22, 26
(emphasis added).
54. Id. at 26.
55. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 pmbl.
56. See id. § l(b) (the Table of Contents effectively describing the breadth of the act, including titles
covering "Public Accounting Oversight Board," "Corporate Responsibility," "Enhanced Financial Disclosures,"
"Corporate and Criminal Fraud Accountability," "White Collar Crime Penalty Enhancements," and "Corporate
Fraud and Accountability").
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of these provisions indicate that Sarbanes-Oxley's purposes extend to, among other
things, increasing oversight by, and the accountability of, management and gate-
keepers and changing corporate culture in a manner that supports ethical con-
duct. 7 These purposes are potential building blocks in the creation and
maintenance of ethical role models in the corporation.
In the aggregate, the prescriptions and proscriptions of Sarbanes-Oxley directly
or indirectly constrain certain otherwise common conduct engaged in by executives
and employees and significantly increase the number and complexity of tasks re-
quired to be completed by corporate executives and employees. s8 The constraints
on conduct come in a variety of forms, each of which is designed to channel execu-
tives toward ethical behavior.
For example, section 406 of Sarbanes-Oxley 9 requires, by directing the Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC) to adopt implementing rules, that a public com-
pany disclose to the SEC whether it has adopted a code of ethics for senior financial
officers (applicable to its principal financial officer and comptroller or principal
accounting officer, or persons performing similar functions) and, if not, the rea-
sons why it has not adopted a code of ethics.6" The law also directs the SEC to
mandate immediate disclosure by a public company of any change to or waiver of
its code of ethics.6'
It is easy to see from the way in which section 406 is drafted that events relating
to the collapse of Enron Corp. in the late fall of 2001 are the genesis of this portion
of the law (and a significant catalyst of Sarbanes-Oxley generally). Enron had a
code of ethics, but it waived compliance with the code in key circumstances 2 En-
ron's conduct and fate demonstrate that "a corporate code of behavior is only as
good as the people charged with enforcing it and those who must demonstrate the
57. See, e.g., George W. Bush, President of the United States, Remarks by the President at Signing of H.R.
3763, Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (July 30, 2002), available at 2002 WL 1751366 [hereinafter Bush Remarks].
58. See id.; see also Jonathan Peterson, Companies Blazing a Paper Trail to Comply with New SEC Rules, L.A.
TIMES, Feb. 24, 2003, § 3, at 1 (noting that many executives now spend most of their time in Sarbanes-Oxley-
related activities).
59. Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 406, 15 U.S.C. § 7264 (Supp. V 2004).
60. Id. § 406(a). The term "code of ethics" is defined to include:
standards . . . reasonably necessary to promote-
(1) honest and ethical conduct, including the ethical handling of actual or apparent conflicts of
interest between personal and professional relationships;
(2) full, fair, accurate, timely, and understandable disclosure in the periodic reports required to
be filed by the issuer; and
(3) compliance with applicable governmental rules and regulations.
Id. § 406(c).
61. Id. § 406(b).
62. See Note, The Good, the Bad, and Their Corporate Codes of Ethics: Enron, Sarbanes-Oxley, and the
Problems with Legislating Good Behavior, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2123, 2129-30 (2003) [hereinafter The Good].
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importance of compliance by their example."63 The limited legislative history indi-
cates that Congress may have recognized this.64
Sarbanes-Oxley section 406 therefore may be viewed as promoting behaviorial
channeling or modification. Specifically, section 406 appears to be devised to em-
phasize ethical management conduct by imposing disclosure requirements that are
designed to engage those outside and inside the corporation in conversations and
analyses of the ethics and actions of senior management.6 This approach allows for
greater scrutiny of both the ethical constraints imposed by the corporation on its
management and the board's oversight of those constraints.
Although section 30266 of Sarbanes-Oxley does not deal directly with corporate
ethics, its intent to encourage ethical conduct also is clear. Section 302 directs the
SEC to establish rules requiring the principal executive officer or officers and the
principal financial officer or officers to certify each periodic report and certain
other items, including: their review of the report; the absence of misstatements or
omissions to state material fact in that report (to their knowledge); the fair presen-
tation of the financial statements included in the report (to their knowledge); their
responsibility for, and other matters relating to, internal controls;67 their disclosure
of certain key negative items affecting the corporation (significant deficiencies and
fraud); and changes to internal controls or matters affecting internal controls.68
Certification of financial statement compliance also is required under a separate
provision of Sarbanes-Oxley, section 906, under which criminal penalties may be
assessed for noncompliance.69
The certification requirements in Sarbanes-Oxley section 302 and section 906
reinforce ethical behavior in the corporation by making two of the most senior
corporate executives personally responsible for the accuracy and completeness of
key financial and operating information included in periodic reports required to be
filed by all public companies.7" Sections 302 and 906 also make these corporate
officers responsible for the process underlying the production of the corporation's
financial statements,7' and section 906 makes these same officers personally, crimi-
63. Id. at 2130.
64. See 148 CONG. REC. H5472 (daily ed. July 25, 2002) (statement of Rep. Jackson-Lee).
65. Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 406(b) (requiring "the immediate disclosure ... dissemination by the Internet or
by other electronic means, by any issuer of any change in or waiver of the code of ethics for senior financial
officers.").
66. Id. § 302 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 7241).
67. Id. § 302(a)(1)-(4)(A). A related provision to section 302(a)(4)(A), Sarbanes-Oxley section 404, re-
quires the SEC to establish rules providing for an internal control report that "state[s] the responsibility of
management for establishing and maintaining an adequate internal control structure and procedures for finan-
cial reporting" as well as "contain an assessment, as of the end of the most recent fiscal year of the issuer, of the
effectiveness of the internal control structure and procedures of the issuer for financial reporting." Id. § 404(a)
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 7262(a)).
68. Id. § 302(a)(5)-(6).
69. Id. § 906 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1350).
70. See id. §§ 302, 906.
71. See id. §§ 302(a)(4), 906(b).
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nally liable for knowing noncompliance with the related financial statement certifi-
cation requirements.72
Although prior law included executive signature requirements (which still exist)
and related certifications as part of the reporting responsibility for every public
company, after enactment of the more stringent officer certification and penalty
provisions Sarbanes-Oxley, it is clear that corporate officers cannot "look the other
way" when it comes to important corporate disclosures, especially those in the cor-
poration's financial statements.73 In light of the pervasiveness of the requirements
and the strict nature of the potential penalties, Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) and
Chief Financial Officers (CFOs) ask the subordinate employees responsible for as-
sembling and checking the financial information included in each periodic report
to certify the same matters to them that they have to certify under section 302."M
While this "passing of the buck" may seem to take away from the primary responsi-
bility of the key responsible executives, this process may, if executed in an appropri-
ate social context, have the unintended benefit of encouraging ethical behavior in
each of these subordinates.
As final examples (although there are many more75), it seems important to con-
sider sections 40276 and 30677 of Sarbanes-Oxley, which effectively prohibit, respec-
tively, (1) loans by public companies to their executives, other than ordinary course
consumer lending transactions (punishable through an SEC enforcement action
against the company);7" and (2) most trading of equity securities acquired in con-
nection with service for the firm during any pension fund "blackout period" (pun-
ishable through profit disgorgement by the executive).79  These statutory
72. See id. § 906(c).
73. Lawrence A. Cunningham, The Sarbanes-Oxley Yawn: Heavy Rhetoric, Light Reform (And It Just Might
Work), 35 CONN. L. REV. 915, 955-56 (2003) ("These provisions look to prevent CEOs and CFOs from hiding
behind the defense of ignorance."). See generally Lisa M. Fairfax, Form Over Substance?: Officer Certification and
the Promise of Enhanced Personal Accountability Under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 55 RUTtERs L. REV. 1 (2002)
(acknowledging that the certification requirements may force better internal controls, but arguing that their
overall importance may be merely symbolic).
74. Cunningham, supra note 73, at 955 ("As a practical matter, the chief effect is that those officers will
now insist that subordinates certify what they send up-generating 'sub-certifications.'").
75. Of particular note are the lengthened statute of limitations for securities fraud actions provided for in
sections 804 of Sarbanes-Oxley, Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 804(b) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1658(b)),
which may make it easier to pursue fraudulent actors, and the stiffer penalties for fraud introduced in section
807 of Sarbanes-Oxley, id. at § 807 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1348), which may increase deterrence
by increasing apprehension about significant jail time or monetary fines. An increased risk of legal action or
significant penalties may channel behavior away from illegal activity.
76. Id. § 402 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78m(k)).
77. Id. § 306 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 7244).
78. Id. § 402 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78m(k)).
79. Id. § 306(a) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 7244). The term "blackout period" is defined to
generally include, subject to exceptions, a
period of more than 3 consecutive business days during which the ability of not fewer than 50
percent of the participants or beneficiaries under all individual account plans maintained by the
issuer to purchase, sell, or otherwise acquire or transfer an interest in any equity of such issuer held
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prohibitions on conduct, like many other provisions in Sarbanes-Oxley, directly
address (by proscription of related activities-personal loans and trading during
blackout periods) certain unethical, even if not illegal, conduct engaged in by cor-
porate executives in public companies involved in fraudulent behavior."0 By putting
a halt to activities that may be used by executives in unethical ways, sections 402
and 306 of Sarbanes-Oxley aim to promote ethical behavior.
These selected provisions from Sarbanes-Oxley evidence a pervasive scheme to
encourage ethical behavior in the executive ranks of corporate America."' While
they do not directly address the attraction of ethical, humble people to those ranks,
the ethical behavior requirements and guidance created by these provisions may
make the public company CEO or CFO job more attractive to an ethical candidate
(or, at least, less attractive to an unethical applicant). However, there is no solid
empirical evidence-yet-that the requisite societal environment for an ethical
corporate culture, including appropriate situational constraints on behavior, has
developed or is developing in such a way as to support Sarbanes-Oxley's ethical
mission or that Sarbanes-Oxley encourages the kind of behavior and transparency
that is exhibited by ethical role models.8 2
III. SYNTHESIS AND CONCLUSION
Through its many disclosure, conduct, process, and penalty provisions, Sarbanes-
Oxley attempts to create a common core of ethical behavior in public companies.
This is a laudatory purpose, and there is some evidence that behaviors have
changed in a positive direction as a result of the implementation of the Act. For
example, public company executives necessarily are spending more time on assur-
ing the accuracy and completeness of financial statements and other information
in such an individual account plan is temporarily suspended by the issuer or by a fiduciary of the
plan ....
Id. § 306(a)(4)(A).
80. Professor Lawrence Cunningham outlines the direct relationship between these two provisions of
Sarbanes-Oxley in an early article on the act. With respect to Rule 402, he notes:
The provision is a direct response to the non-accounting corporate scandals at Adelphia and Tyco,
both of which made sweetheart loans to insiders, tallying in Adelphia's case more than $ 3.2 billion.
Sweetheart loans are often used by insiders at late-stage companies, when powerholders know before
others that insolvency is around the corner (those at Adelphia, a telecom player, are likely examples).
Cunningham, supra note 73, at 960. Similarly, in commenting on the origins of Rule 306, he observes that "[ait
the Big Four Frauds and other companies in the financial tornadoes following the tele-dot-com meltdown,
insiders sold shares as stock prices plunged-even as the company's pension plan participants were forbidden
under existing federal rules to sell shares or make other investment switches." Id. at 958.
81. See, e.g., Stephanie Armour, More Companies Urge Workers to Blow the Whistle, USA TODAY, Dec. 16,
2002, at lB (discussing companies' increasing encouragement of whistlblowers in the wake of Sarbanes-Oxley);
Bush Remarks, supra note 57.
82. There are, however, some anecdotal examples of corporate policies and programs in the post-
Sarbanes-Oxley era that positively influence ethical role modeling and culture. E.g., Sepesy, supra note 52, at
34-38.
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included in periodic reports.8 3 A recent paper notes that Sarbanes-Oxley may be
increasing accountability and reducing risk-taking in a way that could be construed
as positive.8 4
However, the full benefits of Sarbanes-Oxley may not be achievable if their reali-
zation depends on the encouragement and sustained existence of ethical role mod-
els in public companies. In particular, despite creating a complex ethics system for
public company executives by legal prescription, proscription, and penalty,
Sarbanes-Oxley may not encourage-and in fact may discourage-the ongoing
cultivation of ethical executive role models. There are two principal reasons why
Sarbanes-Oxley may have this unintended negative effect, and they are interrelated.
First, Sarbanes-Oxley may fail to create or support the social context necessary to
maintain the ethical framework it imposes, Second, senior executives are over-
whelmed with compliance-related activities, affording them little time to engage in
the kind of open, transparent interactions with each other and others in the corpo-
ration that will enable the establishment, transmission, and internalization of ethi-
cal values in the corporation. 6
Sarbanes-Oxley ultimately may fail to motivate public company executives to
concerted ethical behavior (stymieing role model production) because of its social
construction-the way the regulation plays out in the corporate setting. 7 This so-
cial construction emanates from the origins of the Act and continues through its
implementation over time. 8 Accordingly, the ideas expressed here are necessarily
preliminary. 9
Sarbanes-Oxley is crisis legislation-adopted in haste as a result of significant
political pressure for a legislative cure-all to our nation's highly publicized corpo-
rate scandals.9" The Act was enacted and is being implemented in an environment
and manner that (at least arguably) disrespects executives and others in and en-
83. Cynthia A. Glassman, Comm'r, SEC, Speech at the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago Conference on
Bank Structure and Competition: Private and Public Sector Responses to Corporate Governance Issues (May 9,
2003), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch05O903cag.htm.
84. See Donald C. Langevoort, The Social Construction of Sarbanes-Oxley, 105 MICH. L. REv. 1817,
1828-33 (2007).
85. See infra notes 87-98 and accompanying text; see also Hess et al., supra note 5, at 758 (noting, for
example, that "requiring firms to force compliance programs upon their employees runs the risk of developing
distrust and working against the development of compliant and ethical organizations").
86. See infra notes 99-104 and accompanying text.
87. See generally Langevoort, supra note 84. Langevoort's paper aims "to illuminate the social nature of
SOX's diffusion into practice." 1d. at 1819. Langevoort also suggests a possibility that the "[e]nhanced indepen-
dent director responsibilities, more expansive external audits, and pervasive internal controls [included in
Sarbanes-Oxley] all have the capacity to be symbolic rather than real" and ultimately lead "[m]anagers . . . to
capture control of them to reduce their potency-in good faith." Id. at 1854.
88. Id. at 1819-20, 1845 ("SOX's meaning and perceived legitimacy will be determined by an interaction
among all the interpretive communities .... ).
89. Id. at 1854 ("SOX's social construction will be a product of the interaction between choices now being
made and events yet to come.").
90. See id. at 1821.
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gaged with public corporations, which may impact the Act's ability to influence
executive behavior and, therefore, corporate culture and role modeling. Despite the
significant burdens imposed on public company executives by Sarbanes-Oxley, be-
cause of the speed with which the Act and underlying regulations were adopted,
corporate officials had little influence on or investment in the substance of the Act
or the regulations adopted by the SEC and other agencies under the Act.9'
If, as was earlier noted, law has a propensity to affect behavior only when society
accepts the substance of the law and the process by which the law was adopted and
implemented,92 then Sarbanes-Oxley may have missed the mark. Former SEC
Commissioner Cynthia Glassman apparently understands this connection between
law and society (both outside and inside the corporation) in motivating ethical
behavior, based on public comments in which she has expressed uncertainty about
the ultimate efficacy of the SEC's rulemaking under Sarbanes-Oxley in creating the
intended ethical environment.
I can't walk away from any discussion of corporate governance without
stressing that the most important aspect of reform comes from market partici-
pants working proactively to foster an ethical culture in business. This high-
lights the importance of market-based reforms because ethics is an area where
the government frankly cannot legislate or regulate.
The Commission has put significant new rules on the books that I believe
will affect behavior positively by providing incentives more consistent with fi-
duciary responsibilities. However, I hope we have not created unrealistic expec-
tations that the new rules will solve all of our problems. Empty promises will
not restore trust. Only if officers and directors follow the spirit as well as the
letter of the new rules, will investors again place their full confidence to the
markets.93
Corporate executives (and, to a lesser extent, investors and other interested constit-
uencies in the public at-large) question both the substance of the Act (and related
agency regulations) and the process by which the law was enacted (and related
regulations were adopted).94 The lack of executive participation in and buy-in for
91. This may or may not be relevant in the long run. "[S]tories about statutory origins and early histories
tend to fade in importance-or be revised in collective memory-as regulation is implemented, interpreted,
and enforced." Id. at 1833.
92. See supra note 41 and accompanying text (citing Lavoie, supra note 32, at 138).
93. Glassman, supra note 83.
94. See Jill E. Fisch, Institutional Competition to Regulate Corporations: A Comment on Macey, 55 CASE W.
REs. L. REv. 617, 619 (2005) ("Many corporate executives have criticized Sarbanes-Oxley as an overreaction-
imposing substantial compliance costs on the vast majority of law-abiding corporations based on the wrongdo-
ing of a few bad apples."); Langevoort, supra note 84, at 1834-35 (stating an assumption, based on a hypothesis
that executives "generally do not think of themselves as working directly for corporate shareholders," that "on
average, managers consider SOX an intrusion and resent nearly all of it").
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Sarbanes-Oxley presents impediments to executive compliance with the letter and
spirit of the Act.
To the extent that a societal context is created by Sarbanes-Oxley, it may be a
culture of fear. An environment in which fear reigns may not be conducive to open
ethical interactions.95 Fear also may prompt executives to divert themselves from
more useful ethical activities to compliance activities that may not measurably im-
prove corporate governance or culture.96 A culture of fear may, therefore, breed
operating inefficiencies without necessarily increasing ethical corporate culture.
Speaking of inefficiencies, Sarbanes-Oxley is an expensive corporate proposition,
and many feel that the expense is not appropriately allocated to and among those
who need the behavioral corrections imposed by the Act.97 Although the penalty
provisions of Sarbanes-Oxley enable broad censure of executives who fail to comply
(serving as a societal constraint on ethical behavior),9" there is little additional evi-
dence that Sarbanes-Oxley has created an appropriate societal context supportive of
an ethical corporate culture. Without the appropriate, supportive societal context,
Sarbanes-Oxley's ethical behavior system may fail to take permanent root in execu-
tives and enable them to serve as effective ethical role models.
Moreover, public company executives are so mired in the details of complying
with Sarbanes-Oxley that (even if they are so inclined) they have little time to
interact sincerely and openly among themselves and with others in the corporation
in a manner that would enable them to serve as role models for Sarbanes-Oxley's
ethical framework." The officer certification and related internal controls provi-
sions are particularly time-consuming, even if some of the time spent is
misdirected.
[W]e hear . . . that senior executives are spending much more time on the
content of financial statements, including, by some accounts, a substantial
amount of time on details that are not material to the presentation of the
company's financial position. This is an unintended, but not wholly unex-
95. Cf. Kevin Werbach, Sensors and Sensibilities, 28 CARDOZO L. REv. 2321, 2367 (2007) (noting the "de-
bate about whether ... social shaming goes too far, and could create a culture of fear in which any behavioral
lapse in public could permanently damage someone's reputation").
96. See Paul Fiorelli, Will U.S. Sentencing Commission Amendments Encourage a New Ethical Culture Within
Organizations?, 39 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 565, 573 (2004) ("[T]hose honest executives who were using codes
effectively prior to the Act will have perverse incentives to rewrite them for fear of the litigation and negative
market signals that may stem from the heightened disclosure that Sarbanes-Oxley requires.").
97. See Fisch, supra note 94, at 619; Langevoort, supra note 84, at 1835 (noting that the cost of compliance
is an issue that often raises criticism of SOX); Mintz, supra note 7, at 582 ("[lit appears that the SOA [Sarbanes-
Oxley Act] may be a costly example of the many paying for the mistakes of the few.").
98. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 807, 116 Stat. 745, 807 (codified as amended at
18 U.S.C. § 1348 (Supp. V 2006)).
99. See, e.g., Deborah Solomon & Cassell Bryan-Low, Companies Complain About Cost of Corporate-Gov-
ernance Rules, WALL ST. J., Feb. 10, 2004, at Al ("The real cost isn't the incremental dollars, it is having people
that should be focused on the business focused instead on complying with the details of the rules." (internal
quotations omitted)).
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pected, consequence as executives adjust to the idea of certifying results ...
Hopefully, to the extent a problem exists, it will work itself out over time as
companies have more experience operating under the new rules.'
The overall danger in creating a heavy, detailed, expensive, time-consuming, le-
gally driven system of "compliance ethics" is that the principle efforts of the firm
are devoted to compliance, and a system of "enterprise ethics" therefore never de-
velops.'1 The focus of management may remain on meeting the established legal
requirements, merely for the sake of assuring compliance and avoiding resulting
penalties for noncompliance. 2 The established legal and regulatory norms may
come to replace, rather than supplement, market-based checks on business ethics
and market-based sources of positive ethical change."'
If there is anything that a careful review of ethics crises through the years has
taught us, it is that we don't solve root causes by making more rules and laws.
Hopes in this direction are misplaced. While the current perp walk, indict-
ments, and trials are all necessary judgments on the past, they bring us no
closer to a brighter future. Worse, they impart a false image of business as a
process that is separate from ethics .... "'
Some blame the narrow focus of state law norms and fiduciary duties applicable
to directors and officers for creating an environment that fails to foster ethics in the
corporation.' However, as Congress enacts federal laws that extend further into
corporate governance, it bears at least some of the responsibility in ensuring that
law and regulation at a minimum coexist with, rather than supplant or dismantle,
ethics in the corporation. Accordingly, federal corporate governance initiatives
should be adopted only after a careful evaluation of their propensity to cultivate
ethics in the corporation. As part of this effort, attention should be paid to foster-
ing ethical role models in the executive ranks.
100. Glassman, supra note 83.
101. Freeman, supra note 53, at 24 (using the quoted terms in a text box entitled "A uniting of'the letter
and the spirit'").
102. Id. ("In trying to address current ethics issues, we must be careful not to think we can legislate away
every problem, issue, or variance."); see also Seglin, supra note 34, at 4.
103. Freeman, supra note 53, at 24 ("[W]hen we create a false belief that all problems and issues are ad-
dressed by rules and regulations, we potentially discourage the kind of employee pushback and questioning
that drove whistleblowers like Sherron Watkins at Enron and Cynthia Cooper at WorldCom to uncover two of
the largest corporate frauds in history.").
104. Id. at 24-25; see also Mintz, supra note 7, at 595 ("While new regulations can impose penalties for
violating governance standards, they cannot create an ethical culture that fosters responsible behaviour. This
can only occur if top management and the board establish an ethical environment in the organisation, one that
promotes integrity, accountability and transparency.").
105. Freeman, supra note 53, at 25.
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As this discussion admits, the encouragement of ethical decision making in the
corporation likely involves a complex interaction among state and federal laws and
among a number of cognitive and behavioral factors in a societal context."' For
example, as to interactions between and among legal rules, the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines were amended after Sarbanes-Oxley in an attempt to strengthen ethical
culture and behaviors in the corporation by creating ethics compliance programs
that effectuate culture change. °7 These amendments work hand in hand with
Sarbanes-Oxley in promoting ethical corporate environments, and (in fact) were
prompted to some extent by the Act.' However, forces other than legislation and
regulation may be successful, working with legal and regulatory pronouncements,
in cultivating the appropriate interactions and environment for ethical role model-
ing and culture. For example, pressure from industry or peer groups, like The
Business Roundtable, may be used to encourage the proliferation of ethical behav-
ior and decision making in the corporation. °9 Lawyers and other professional
gatekeepers (many of whom are subject to new or enhanced regulation under
Sarbanes-Oxley), as well as their scholar counterparts, also may play an informal
role in attracting the right people to management positions and encouraging them
to create and maintain ethical corporate culture."' And, although the business
judgment rule seems antithetical to the concept, courts may interpret and apply
106. See generally Linda Klebe Trevifio, Ethical Decision Making in Organizations: A Person-Situation Inter-
actionist Model, 11 ACAD. OF MGMT. REV. 601 (1986) (discussing the interactionist model of decision making).
107. See supra note 5. The U.S. Sentencing Commission's work in this area is rooted in the same overall
bodies of literature that support role modeling as important to the establishment and maintenance of a corpo-
ration's ethical culture.
The changes to the Guidelines to achieve the Commission's goal ... are supported by research from
management scholars. Although most compliance programs have characteristics of both compliance-
based and integrity-based programs, the most successful programs are those where the characteristics
of an integrity-based approach dominate. One of the most important factors is that of management
commitment. When management demonstrates a commitment to ethics, then all members of the
organization are more likely to view ethics as a key organizational value and take legal compliance
initiatives more seriously. The new Guidelines expand the roles of top management by requiring
them to participate in training. The Guidelines also create a duty for top management to ensure the
effectives of the program.
Hess et al., supra note 5, at 744-45 (footnotes omitted).
108. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 805(a)(5), 116 Stat. 745, 805 (providing that
"the United States Sentencing Commission shall review and amend, as appropriate, the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines and related policy statements to ensure that.., the guidelines that apply to organizations in United
States Sentencing Guidelines, chapter 8, are sufficient to deter and punish organizational criminal
misconduct").
109. To some extent, this already has been done. Michele D. Beardslee, IfMultidisciplinary Partnerships are
Introduced into the United States, What Could or Should be the Role of General Counsel?, 9 FORDHAM J. CORP. &
FIN. L. 1, 78-79 (2003) ("The Sarbanes-Oxley Act is calling out for companies to be vigilant with how they
manage internal ethics and external relationships. Corporate-related professional associations, like The Busi-
ness Roundtable, have done the same, calling out for companies, on their own, to enact best practices in
corporate governance."). But more is and will be needed.
110. See Therese H. Maynard, Is the Moral Dimension of Fiduciary Duty Law Relevant to Teaching and Law
Practice?: Law Matters. Lawyers Matter, 76 TUL. L. REV. 1501, 1825-28 (2002); Fred C. Zacharias, Coercing
Clients: Can Lawyer Gatekeeper Rules Work?, 47 B.C. L. REV 455, 456 (2006) ("[L]awyers have legally recognized
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legal rules to reinforce positive culture and ethics in the corporation.'" Discrete
efforts undertaken along these lines have not coalesced into concerted action that
has made a cognizable difference in ethical role modeling or culture (likely, in large
part, due to competing values and constituents within each interest group)." 2 Nev-
ertheless, these catalytic socio-legal forces-and the interaction among them and
with legal rules-deserve further exploration as means of encouraging a receptive
corporate context for Sarbanes-Oxley and other corporate governance reforms.
Regardless, legislation and regulatory pronouncements must and will continue
to play a strong, and (hopefully) more enlightened, role. Among other things,
legislatures, agencies, and self-regulatory organizations may begin to encourage
ethical role models and cultures if they focus some attention on rewarding ethical
best practices rather than merely penalizing noncompliant behavior."3 At least one
noted scholar has suggested that legislation-specifically, Sarbanes-Oxley-has the
capacity "to reward truthful corporations and their management.""' 4 Among other
things, law can reward good behavior by exempting ethical actors from the applica-
tion of weighty regulation under certain circumstances."' An incentive program of
authority to pressure clients into accepting their advice-particularly when that advice concerns illegal or
wrongful conduct.").
111. See 1 AM. LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
§ 2.01(b)(20), & cmt. h (1994) (indicating that courts can sustain actions taken by corporate officials that
"take into account emerging ethical principles, reasonably regarded as appropriate to the responsible conduct
of business, that have significant support although less-than-universal acceptance."); Hess et al., supra note 5, at
740 ("[lt does appear that the [Federal Sentencing] Guidelines encourage judges and prosecutors to look for
evidence of an ethical corporate culture and not simply to look for an effective compliance program. The
Guidelines and Advisory Report clearly specify that an effective compliance program requires a firm to both
'exercise due diligence to prevent and detect criminal conduct' and develop an ethical culture."); Therese H.
Maynard, Spinning in a Hot IPO-Breach of Fiduciary Duty or Business as Usual, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2023,
2062-63 (2002) ("By rigorously enforcing principles of fiduciary duty, the courts are reinforcing the legitimate
expectations of investors (and others) who deal with corporate managers as to acceptable standards of business
ethics .... [Tihe courts should not relinquish their traditional role of enforcing fiduciary duty law to regulate
ethical standards of conduct for corporate managers."). One reading of Paramount Communications, Inc. v.
Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1153 (Del. 1989) is that the court's decision reinforces a valued corporate culture.
See David Millon, Frontiers of Legal Thought I: Theories of the Corporation, 1990 DUKE L.J. 201, 257 (noting that
the deciding judge "was 'not persuaded that there may not be instances in which the law might recognize as
valid a perceived threat to a "corporate culture" that is shown to be palpable (for lack of a better word),
distinctive and advantageous.'"). "[l1t is ... important to emphasize that equity, and the power of courts to
look to considerations of fairness, plays a large role in corporate law, especially in the important Delaware
courts. Indeed, the equitable power of courts to consider basic fairness in making and applying corporate law
overlays an expansive ethical quilt on the body of corporate law." Eric W. Orts, The Complexity and Legitimacy
of Corporate Law, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1565, 1605-06 (1993) (footnotes omitted).
112. See, e.g., Zacharias, supra note 110, at 501-03.
113. See Jeffrey L. Seglin, The Right Thing: The Jail Threat Is Real. So, Will Executives Behave?, N.Y. TIMES,
July 20, 2003, §3, at 4 ("Sending chief executives to jail may indeed send a powerful message, albeit one that is
decidedly short term.").
114. Frankel, supra note 47, at 161 ("Honest corporations should receive a competitive advantage by receiv-
ing relief from some of the provisions of the Act so that those provisions are imposed only on rogue
corporations.").
115. Id. at 186-89.
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this kind should reward ethical role models in the executive suite, even if only
indirectly.'6
Unfortunately, despite (and, in fact, because of) its detailed efforts in creating a
compliance ethics culture, Sarbanes-Oxley, as currently constituted, likely fails to
foster the creation of ethical executive role models in the corporation, and ethical
role modeling is significant to ethical corporate culture. Ethics regulation without
necessary culture change may not achieve underlying policy objectives. Accord-
ingly, at best, Sarbanes-Oxley may be a necessary but insufficient reaction to the
corporate scandals exposed in the early years of the new millennium. Unless
Sarbanes-Oxley is amended to better incentivize the development and maintenance
of ethical corporate role models or other forces rise to support the establishment of
ethical role models in corporate management, achievement of the overall purposes
of the Act may not be possible.
Stated somewhat differently, by failing to take into account the role of social
context and human interaction in promoting ethics in the corporation, legislators
may have unintentionally weakened or undercut the potential impact of Sarbanes-
Oxley. In ignoring these factors in corporate governance rule making, Congress
(and at its direction, the SEC) may be hindering the establishment and mainte-
nance of ethical executive role models and, if the commonly accepted rhetoric is
correct, thwarting the attainment of one of Sarbanes-Oxley's key purposes-the
achievement of good corporate governance. At a minimum, future corporate gov-
ernance rule making should take these factors into account and better foster ethical
role modeling and other attributes of a positive corporate culture in public
companies.
116. Id. at 171-73. Perhaps the law could incentivize corporations to reward executive role models. By
rewarding corporate executives, corporations can build social capital to increase trust in and within the
corporation.
[I]f an organization wants to be an ethical one, then it cannot rely on individual managers and
employees to regularly risk sacrificing their own financial well-being and career potential to make it
happen. Instead, the organization must take on this responsibility. The firm must develop incentives
that reward people for not selling infested cookies and punish them if they do. This means that ethics
is not simply about hiring people with personal integrity; it means that ethics is also about organiza-
tional structures that reward the right behavior. In other words, to foster integrity, one needs to
address utilitarian considerations in which just treatment of stakeholders is rewarded so that the
greatest good is achieved. Or, to put it in more conventional business terms, it is important to create
win-win environments for multiple stakeholders. Through this process, social capital is established,
which, in turn, builds Real Confidence and trust among stakeholders that the firm will treat them
fairly.
Hess et al., supra note 5, at 751.
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The Changing Atmospherics of Corporate Crime
Sentencing in the Post-Sarbanes-Oxley Act Era
THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002' HAS BEEN VIEWED as a watershed event in
dealing with corporate fraud. The law requires publicly-traded companies to adopt
extensive-some say onerous2-internal controls to ensure that organizations can-
not again be used to perpetrate the perceived frauds of Enron and WorldCom,
regardless of whether that perception reflects reality in any way.3 In response to
questions about who should be held responsible to prevent the next wave of corpo-
rate fraud, Congress enhanced the power of auditors to scour corporations for pos-
sible material weaknesses and required lawyers for the first time to act as
"gatekeepers" for their corporate clients No Congressional enactment can ever be
complete without the seemingly obligatory criminal law provisions that adopt new
measures to prosecute corporate miscreants and send them to jail for ever-longer
prison terms.
The new criminal laws added by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act did little more than add
a few arrows to the bountiful quiver of federal prosecutors-charges that can be
added on top of the usual suspects of mail fraud, wire fraud, and false SEC filings
in corporate prosecutions. Where the Act actually effected substantial change was
in the sentencing of defendants convicted of committing crimes through business
organizations, especially publicly-traded companies. In a direct way, the Act re-
quired the United States Sentencing Commission to ratchet up the potential
sentences of defendants by adding new or increased enhancements to the sentenc-
ing calculation for fraud offenses Indirectly, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act changed the
I Professor of Law, Wayne State University Law School. © 2008 Peter J. Henning. I appreciate the
assistance of Olive Hyman and the editors of the Journal of Business & Technology Law.
1. Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 11, 15, 18, 28, and 29
U.S.C.).
2. See Joseph Schuman, A Corporate Oversight Rule Looks Set to be Eased, WALL ST. J., Nov. 10, 2006.
3. Sara B. Smith, Note, Sarbanes-Oxley Act, Section 307-The Price of Accountability: How Will Section 307
Affect the Role of the Corporate Attorney?, 107 W. VA. L. REV. 901, 931 (2005).
4. Thomas C. Pearson & Gideon Mark, Investigations, Inspections, and Audits in the Post-SOX Environ-
ment, 86 NEB. L. REV. 43, 58, 62 (2007); Fred Zacharias, Lawyers as Gatekeepers, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1387,
1402-03 (2004).
5. Sarbanes-Oxley Act §§ 903-06, 1104.
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atmosphere of criminal sentencing by signaling to federal judges that the light
sentences once meted out to white collar offenders were no longer acceptable.6
An emboldened Department of Justice began pursuing executive officers of com-
panies perceived as being enmeshed in fraud, and after the convictions, judges were
more than willing to impose substantial terms of imprisonment by following the
Sentencing Guidelines. Punishments that would make a few drug dealers blanch
became, while not quite routine, at least within the realm of possibility for chief
executive officers (CEOs) charged with leading their companies into ruin. For ex-
ample, Bernie Ebbers, former CEO of WorldCom, received a twenty-five year
prison term,7 while former Enron CEO Jeffrey Skilling received a bit over twenty-
four years.8 Other CEOs who received lengthy prison terms even when their com-
panies did not fail include the twelve-year terms for Sanjay Kumar from Computer
Associates9 and Walter Forbes of Cendant.' Prosecutions for leaving a company in
shambles still can be seen, such as with David Stockman," but such conduct is no
longer a prerequisite for the prosecution of a senior corporate officer. Defendants
like Gregory Reyes of Brocade Communications 2 and Conrad Black of Hollinger
International 3 were charged with crimes without regard to the health or viability of
their companies, which continue in business today.
The changed atmospherics of corporate crime sentencing is not entirely attribu-
table to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. A significant change in the potential severity of
sentences for fraud went into force in November 2001 when the Sentencing Com-
mission adopted changes to the Guidelines that increased the potential sentence
based on the amount of the loss (or the defendant's gain).'" Those changes went
into effect almost at the exact time Enron started to implode,"s a process that led to
the adoption of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act the following year. The Act provided a
strong impetus toward the substantial sentences we are now seeing in corporate
crime cases, making lengthy prison terms for executives (which were once unthink-
able) almost commonplace.
In this Essay, I will review briefly the additions to the federal criminal law arsenal
adopted by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, and note its more important sentencing provi-
sions that pushed judges to give longer sentences in corporate fraud cases. 6 To
6. See United States v. Ebbers, 458 F.3d 110, 129-30 (2d Cir. 2006).
7. Id. at 112.
8. Alexei Barrionuevo, Skilling Sentenced to 24 Years, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 24, 2006, at Cl.
9. Ex-Software Executive Begins Prison Term, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 15, 2007, at C5.
10. Ex-Cendant Chairman Sentenced for Fraud, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 18, 2007, at C21.
11. Collins & Aikman Sues David Stockman, Its Former Chief, N.Y. TIMES, May 19, 2007, at C4.
12. Indictment, United States v. Reyes, 2006 WL 4686714 (N.D. Cal. 2006) (No. CR 06 0556 CRB).
13. First Superseding Indictment, United States v. Black, 2005 WL 4659915 (N.D. Ill. 2005) (No. 05 CR
727).
14. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §§ 2Bl.(b)(1), cmt. n.2(B) (2001), amended by U.S. SEN-
TENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL app. C, amend. 617 (2002).
15. Alex Berenson, S.E.C. Opens Investigation into Enron, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 1, 2001, at C4.
16. See infra Parts I, II.
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illustrate how things have changed since the enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, I
will apply a sentencing analysis to a hypothetical CEO based on the 2000 version of
the Sentencing Guidelines and the 2007 version, which incorporates the effects of
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.1 7 This comparison demonstrates just how much the Act
impels judges to impose significant sentences, even after the Sentencing Guidelines
became advisory and no longer bound judges to follow its prescriptions rigidly.
The push for higher sentences may be abating, however, or even reversed, now that
the Supreme Court has made it clear that federal judges enjoy substantial discretion
in crafting sentences that need not adhere strictly to the Guidelines. 8 That process
may well lead to lower sentences, largely ending the push for greater punishment
embodied in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. 9
I. THE CRIMINAL PROVISIONS OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT
Congress took three steps in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act to enhance criminal penalties.
Specifically, Congress created new criminal offenses, increased the sentences for the
fraud provisions most commonly charged in corporate crime prosecutions, and
directed the Sentencing Commission to increase the potential penalties for a range
of fraud offenses in the Sentencing Guidelines. The criminal provisions of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act created four new crimes and expanded the scope of one
other.20 The new offenses are:
* securities fraud; 2'
* CEO/Chief financial officer (CFO) certification;
22
* destruction of records in an investigation or bankruptcy; 23 and
* destruction of corporate audit papers.24
Congress expanded the scope of one of the obstruction of justice provisions to
clarify that it is now a crime to alter or destroy a document to make it unavailable
in an investigation, or to otherwise impede an official proceeding.25 These provi-
sions were viewed by Congress as correcting gaps in the federal criminal firmament
to reach the next Arthur Andersen that shreds documents, and the future CEO who
perpetrates fraud by plumping up the corporate balance sheet.26
17. See infra Part Ill.
18. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 245-46 (2005); see infra Part IV.
19. See infra Part IV.
20. For a thorough review of the criminal law provisions of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, see Lisa H. Nicholson,
The Culture of Under-Enforcement: Buried Treasure, Sarbanes-Oxley and the Corporate Pirate, 5 DEPAUL Bus. &
COM. L.J. 321, 338-43 (2007).
21. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 18 U.S.C. § 1348 (Supp. V 2007).
22. Id. § 1350.
23. Id. § 1519.
24. Id. § 1520.
25. Id. § 1512(c).
26. Gary G. Grindler & Jason A. James, Please Step Away from the Shredder and the "Delete" Key: §§ 802
and 1102 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 41 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 67, 77-83 (2004).
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Aside from the CEO/CFO financial statement certification provision, the new
laws are largely duplicative of other criminal statutes, and indeed the securities
fraud provision is narrower than the often-used antifraud provisions of the federal
securities laws, such as Rule 10b-5.27 There have been few criminal prosecutions
under these new provisions, and these offenses do not appear to have meaningfully
affected prosecutors or the policing of corporations. For example, the new destruc-
tion of records provision has been used a few times, but not in corporate fraud
prosecutions. Rather, the destruction of records provision has been used most
prominently in child pornography cases.2" Even the certification provision has not
been utilized by prosecutors to any great degree, although the SEC has relied on it
in civil enforcement actions.29 The only significant prosecution of a CEO for alleg-
edly certifying false financial statements was the prosecution of former Health-
South CEO Richard Scrushy, who was acquitted of the charge."0
Along with the new crimes, Congress also increased the sentences for the fraud
provisions' most common charges in corporate crime prosecutions. The maximum
sentence for mail and wire fraud jumped from five to twenty years,3 and the maxi-
mum sentence for violations of the federal securities laws, which typically involves
the antifraud provision in Rule 10b-5, went from ten to twenty years.3 2 The penalty
for a conspiracy to engage in mail fraud, wire fraud, or for the violation of the new
securities fraud provision is now equal to the punishment for the object offense
rather than the prior five-year maximum.3
Statutory maximums are largely meaningless, however, because under the Sen-
tencing Guidelines the actual recommended term of imprisonment is always far
less.34 So while it makes for a striking media report to say that a defendant faces 100
years in jail for the charges in an indictment, there is no realistic possibility that the
27. See Phillip Wesley Lambert, Comment, Worlds Are Colliding: A Critique of the Need for the Additional
Criminal Securities Fraud Section in Sarbanes-Oxley, 53 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 839, 851 (2003) ("[A]n examina-
tion of the language contained in [18 U.S.C. § 1348] reveals that it covers virtually identical transactions and
conduct as the language in the Securities Act and Exchange Act, and in some cases, is substantially less protec-
tive of investors than its counterpart provision in the Securities Act.").
28. See, e.g., United States v. Wortman, 488 F.3d 752 (7th Cir. 2007) (upholding the conviction of Amanda
Wortman for violating 18 U.S.C. § 1519 (destruction of records in an investigation) when she broke a CD
believed to contain child pornography).
29. See Daphne Eviatar, Case Closed?, LITIG. 2007: Supp. AM. LAW. & CORP. COUNSEL, Fall 2007, at 18.
30. Betty Joan Thurber, A Behavioral Science Analysis of Sarbanes-Oxley's Certification Requirements-The
Right Kind of Deterrence?, 7 TRANSACTIONS: TENN. J. Bus. L. 123, 140 (2005).
31. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343 (2000 & Supp. V 2007).
32. 15 U.S.C. § 78ff(a) (2000 & Supp. V 2007).
33. 18 U.S.C. § 1349 ("Any person who attempts or conspires to commit any offense under this chapter
shall be subject to the same penalties as those prescribed for the offense, the commission of which was the
object of the attempt or conspiracy."). A conspiracy count allowing the government to try all the corporate
chieftains together is a common feature of these types of cases.
34. See Frank 0. Bowman, III, Pour encourager les autres? The Curious History and Distressing Implications
of the Criminal Provisions of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Sentencing Guidelines Amendments that Followed, 1
OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 373, 384 (2004) ("But in federal white-collar cases, the statutory maximum sentence for a
single count of conviction usually has no relation to the maximum sentence a judge could actually impose
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ultimate sentence-if there is a conviction-will be anywhere close to what Con-
gress authorized as the highest punishment.
The third step in the process of enhancing the criminal penalties was the direc-
tion the Sarbanes-Oxley Act gave the Sentencing Commission to increase the po-
tential penalties for a range of fraud offenses in the Sentencing Guidelines. Section
905 of the Act essentially tells the Commission to "do the right thing" in adjusting
the Guidelines to increase the potential severity of sentences." Two admonitions in
particular send this message to the Commission about sentencing in corporate
fraud cases:
(1) ensure that the sentencing guidelines and policy statements reflect the seri-
ous nature of the offenses and the penalties set forth in this Act, the growing
incidence of serious fraud offenses which are identified above, and the need to
modify the sentencing guidelines and policy statements to deter, prevent, and
punish such offenses;
(2) consider the extent to which the guidelines and policy statements ade-
quately address whether the guideline offense levels and enhancements for vio-
lations of the sections amended by this Act are sufficient to deter and punish
such offenses, and specifically, are adequate in view of the statutory increases
in penalties contained in this Act ....36
Congress could not have been much clearer in asking for increased sentences, and
as the next section shows, it got what it wanted by enacting the Sarbanes-Oxley Act:
significant-if not draconian-corporate fraud sentences.
II. CHANGES IN THE SENTENCING GUIDELINES AND THE BOOKER EFFECT
After the adoption of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, the Sentencing Commission took up
the mandate to update the Guidelines to reflect the recommended enhanced
sentences for corporate crimes. After first adopting emergency amendments in Jan-
uary 2003 to comply with the Act's 180-day deadline,37 the Commission adopted
permanent amendments that went into effect on November 1, 2003. 3' These
changes increased sentences on both the low end of the applicable Guidelines range
and allowed for even longer sentences at the higher end of the Guidelines range.39
because a single criminal scheme so often consists of a multitude of acts separately chargeable as federal
crimes.").
35. Id. at 405-07, 409-11.
36. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 905(b)(1), (2), 116 Stat. 745, 805 (codified at 18
U.S.C. § 994) (emphasis added).
37. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL (Supp. 2003).
38. See id. app. C, vol. II.
39. See Bowman, supra note 34, at 431-32. Professor Bowman discusses the effect of Senator Joseph
Biden's insertion of a "legislative history" into the Congressional Record that suggested changes the Sentencing
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The Sentencing Commission's first step to increase prison terms for corporate
crime was to increase the base offense level for a fraud offense if the crime was
punishable by a term of imprisonment of twenty years or more.4" This played di-
rectly into the provisions of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act that increased the sentences for
mail fraud, wire fraud, and securities fraud to twenty years, thus effectively increas-
ing the starting point for a Guidelines sentence. While a one-level increase sounds
fairly innocuous, it can have the effect of increasing a sentence by as much as a year
or more if the loss from the offense is significant.4'
Next, the Commission added two levels to the fraud loss table, for losses greater
than $200,000,000 and $400,000,000, with a two-level increase for each higher
amount.4 2 This change would have a significant effect on the sentences handed
down in cases where a publicly-traded company collapsed due to fraud by the de-
fendants because most such organizations will have a market capitalization greater
than those amounts. 43
Another step to raise sentences in corporate fraud cases was to add an additional
enhancement based on a larger number of victims, with a six-level increase if there
were more than 250 victims of the crime on top of the two- and four-level en-
hancements for more than ten and more than fifty victims, respectively.44 If the
shareholders of a company are the victims of the fraud, then it often will be quite
easy to establish a large number harmed by the crime because most public compa-
nies have thousands of shareholders. 45 For securities law cases, an additional four-
Commission should make in the Congressional Record right before the Commission decided on the amend-
ments it would adopt in response to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. Id. Professor Bowman concludes:
Senator Biden's "legislative history" is in many respects a curious document. It was written, placed
into the Congressional Record, and delivered to the Sentencing Commission nine months after the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act was passed, but only days before the Commission was to vote on final post-
Sarbanes-Oxley amendments. It is the product of Senator Biden and his staff, not of any committee
or even any group of senators. Its obvious purpose was to tell the Sentencing Commission pointedly
and publicly what Senator Biden wanted them to do. Faced with the prospect that a Justice Depart-
ment appeal to Congress would receive support not only from Republicans but also from a promi-
nent Judiciary Committee Democrat, the Commission voted for a broad-based, albeit small and
curiously structured, sentence increase.
Id. at 432.
40. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2Bl.l(a)(1).
41. See Bowman, supra note 34, at 433 ("First, though a one-base-offense-level increase may seem insignif-
icant, it actually has profound effects on thousands of individual defendants. It bumps up the sentencing range
of every federal fraud defendant by one level, thus increasing the minimum guideline sentence of defendants
subject to imprisonment by roughly ten percent.").
42. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B.(b)(l) (2003).
43. See UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMM'N, REPORT TO CONGRESS: INCREASED PENALTIES UNDER THE
SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002 6 (2003). The Commission also included as a new factor for determining loss in
a corporate fraud case a reduction in the value of equity securities or other corporate assets that resulted from
the offense. Id. at 6 n.4. Thus, the loss calculation was expanded to include not just direct harm to the business,
but also the more indirect harm to investors by looking to any effect on the market price of the securities.
44. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2Bl.l(b)(2).
45. See, e.g., MERGENT FIS, INC., HANDBOOK OF DIVIDEND ACHIEVERS (Brad A. Armbruster ed., 2000)
(revealing the number of shareholders and other institutional information for Abbott Laboratories).
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level enhancement applies if, at the time of the offense, the defendant was an officer
or director of a publicly-traded company.46 Unlike other enhancements that are
more broadly based, this enhancement is limited to prosecutions involving a con-
viction for violating the federal securities laws.47
These changes to the Sentencing Guidelines occurred before the Supreme
Court's decision in United States v. Booker 8 that changed them from being
mandatory to advisory.49 Two recent opinions applying Booker show the continuing
battle over how the Guidelines will be applied. In Rita v. United States,50 the Court
held that a within-Guidelines sentence can be accorded a presumption of reasona-
bleness by a court of appeals reviewing the district court's punishment determina-
tion, at least in what it called the "mine run of cases."'" In Gall v. United States,"2 the
Court determined that a sentence outside the prescribed Guidelines parameters is
not subject to special scrutiny so long as the district court reasonably justified the
ultimate sentence. 3 Further, appellate review of non-Guidelines sentences is lim-
ited to whether the district court abused its discretion, a particularly forgiving stan-
dard that will encourage judges to consider individual factors rather than focusing
solely on the Guidelines. 4 District court judges now have much greater flexibility in
46. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2BI.I(b)(14)(A).
47. Id. Enhancements already in the Guidelines were adjusted to cover the types of corporate collapses that
triggered the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. For example, an existing enhancement for endangering the
safety and soundness of a financial institution, which dates back to the savings and loan crises of the early
1990s, was expanded to include offenses that substantially endanger the solvency or financial security of an
organization that, at any time during the offense, was a publicly traded company or had 1,000 or more employ-
ees. Id. § 2B1.1(b)(12)(B). Along the same lines, if the crime substantially endangered the solvency or financial
security of 100 or more victims, regardless of whether a publicly traded company or other organization was
affected by the offense, then the same four-level enhancement applies. Id. The rationale for these provisions is
that crimes require a longer sentence when they jepoardize the financial security of a significant number of
people. Of course, if the crime has such a significant effect on a company's financial position, the amount of
the loss likely will be substantial, already triggering a significant sentence under the Guidelines. Ultimately,
these enhancements likely serve to make a significant sentence even longer, perhaps reaching life imprisonment
for a financial crime in which there was no threat to public safety. See id.
48. 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
49. Id. at 245.
50. 127 S. Ct. 2456 (2007).
51. Id. at 2465. The Court stated:
An individual judge who imposes a sentence within the range recommended by the Guidelines thus
makes a decision that is fully consistent with the Commission's judgment in general . . . . [T]he
courts of appeals' "reasonableness" presumption, rather than having independent legal effect, simply
recognizes the real-world circumstance that when the judge's discretionary decision accords with the
Commission's view of the appropriate application of § 3553(a) in the mine run of cases, it is proba-
ble that the sentence is reasonable.
Id.
52. 128 S. Ct. 586 (2007).
53. Id. at 591.
54. The Court set forth the following standard for all sentencing after Booker.
Accordingly, after giving both parties an opportunity to argue for whatever sentence they deem ap-
propriate, the district judge should then consider all of the § 3553(a) factors to determine whether
they support the sentence requested by a party. In so doing, he may not presume that the Guidelines
range is reasonable. He must make an individualized assessment based on the facts presented. If he
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deciding what sentence to impose than at any time since the adoption of the Guide-
lines in 1987, but still "a district court should begin all sentencing proceedings by
correctly calculating the applicable Guidelines range."" Thus, the Guidelines re-
main the starting point of the sentencing process.
III. A HYPOTHETICAL SECURITIES FRAUD INVOLVING
CORPORATE EXECUTIVES
To understand the effect of the various changes adopted in response to the de-
mands for increased sentences embodied in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, the following
hypothetical scenario will be used to analyze how comparable conduct would be
treated under the 2000 version and current version of the Guidelines. This illus-
trates the true effect of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act on the criminal law. As will be
shown, the potential sentence in a securities fraud case could equal or exceed what
the Guidelines call for in a drug case involving a significant amount of narcotics or
child sexual abuse prosecution. After reviewing the scenario, I consider whether the
Supreme Court's recent decision in Gall may reverse, at least in part, the trend
toward greater sentences generated by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.
The hypothetical case involves the CEO of a company, Bronco Communications
Corp. (BCC), whose stock is traded on the New York Stock Exchange. BCC owns
television and radio stations in smaller markets throughout the United States. The
CEO, with the board's approval, decides to sell a number of radio stations due to
weakening revenue. Revenue is decreasing because satellite radio services are draw-
ing away listeners from terrestrial radio, and marketers are advertising on the in-
ternet rather than in traditional media outlets. The CEO agrees to deals to sell
seven stations in the Pacific Northwest to one company, and eleven stations in the
Mid-Atlantic area to another company. The CEO and three senior executives, who
were responsible for the sale negotiations, ask each of the purchasing companies to
insert a clause in the contracts that apportions three million dollars from each deal
as a payment for a "non-compete" agreement, under which a private company con-
trolled by the CEO and the executives agrees not to purchase a competing radio
station in the same markets as the stations being sold. The payment will be made
directly to the private company, and the deal agreement makes reference to the
payment, but not the recipient. In a presentation to BCC's board of directors rec-
ommending the deals, the CEO generally refers to the non-compete agreements,
decides that an outside-Guidelines sentence is warranted, he must consider the extent of the devia-
tion and ensure that the justification is sufficiently compelling to support the degree of the variance.
We find it uncontroversial that a major departure should be supported by a more significant justifica-
tion than a minor one. After settling on the appropriate sentence, he must adequately explain the
chosen sentence to allow for meaningful appellate review and to promote the perception of fair
sentencing.
Id. at 596-97.
55. Id. at 596.
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but does not explain that the money will go to a company that he and the other
executives own.
Two years after approving the transactions, an internal auditor raises questions
about who received the two non-compete payments. A review by the audit com-
mittee leads to an investigation by outside counsel, revealing the payments to the
private company. The private company's records show that the CEO received half
the total payments, and the other three executives split the remaining three million
dollars. The BCC board terminates the four executives, and federal prosecutors file
charges against the four executives for securities fraud, (based on false financial
statements fled by the company that did not reflect the true nature of the non-
compete payments), mail fraud (for defrauding BCC), and conspiracy. One defen-
dant pleads guilty and agrees to testify for a reduced sentence of two years, and the
three remaining defendants are convicted on all counts after trial.5 6
Under the 2000 Guidelines, the following would be the major components of the
sentencing calculation under section 2F.l, which applies to fraud offenses:
* Base Offense Level: 6.
* Loss Enhancement: 14 (based on a $6 million loss, or alternatively the defend-
ants' gain from the fraudulent scheme).
* More Than Minimal Planning: 2.
* Abuse of a Position of Trust: 2."
Using an Offense Level of 24, the sentencing range provided in the Guidelines'
Sentencing Table is fifty-one to sixty-three months if the defendants are in Crimi-
nal History Category I, which is usually a safe assumption in white collar crime
cases involving corporate executives." In addition, if any of the defendants testified
at trial and denied that they intended to engage in a scheme to defraud, then after
the conviction the government usually would seek a two-level enhancement for
obstruction of justice.5 9 If applied in this case, the resulting sentencing range would
be sixty-three to seventy-eight months.6"
Under the 2007 Guidelines, which incorporate both the 2001 changes to the
fraud loss table and the enhancements adopted in response to the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act, a much more severe sentence will be available under section 2BI.l:
56. The scenario is very loosely based on the prosecution of Lord Conrad Black, the former CEO of
Hollinger International, and three former executives of the company for siphoning funds from deals by the
company through non-compete payments. See Tim Arango, Black Given Prison Term Over Fraud, N.Y. TiMEs,
Dec. 11, 2007, at Cl. I have made the facts more clearly a criminal violation to facilitate the Sentencing Guide-
lines analysis.
57. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2F1.1(a) (2000).
58. See id. sentencing tbl.
59. Id. § 2F1.I(b)(4)(C).
60. See id. sentencing tbl.
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* Base Offense Level: 7 (assuming the violation occurred after the adoption of
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act's increase in the maximum punishment for mail
fraud and securities violations).
* Loss Enhancement: 18 (based on a $6 million loss, or alternatively the defend-
ants' gain from the fraudulent scheme).
* Sophisticated Means: 2.
* Public Company Officer: 4.6
Using an Offense Level of 31, the sentencing range provided in the Guidelines'
Sentencing Table is 108 to 135 months.6 2 In addition, there are two other enhance-
ments added by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act that could come into play in a corporate
crime case such as this. First, if there are more than 250 victims, which could
include the shareholders of BCC, then a six-level enhancement can be added.63
Second, a four-level enhancement can be applied if the crime threatened the finan-
cial security of a public company or 100 individuals, which could happen in a case
involving the diversion of assets and filing of false financial statements.64 If the
Offense Level was 35, then the sentencing range would be 168 to 210 months, 65
while an Offense Level of 37 triggers a 210 to 262 month sentence.66 Should both
enhancements be applied, which could occur in a future Enron or WorldCom sce-
nario, then the sentencing range would stretch from 300 months to life
imprisonment.
The effect of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act on sentencing in corporate crime cases
under the Sentencing Guidelines is clear. The sentencing range for fraud offenses
since 2001 has at least doubled, and depending on whether the court applies addi-
tional enhancements now available for substantial economic crimes, the defendant
could face anywhere from twenty years to life in prison. These sentencing ranges
are similar to what defendants receive for promoting sexual activity with minors
under section 2G1.3,67 or trafficking in narcotics under section 2D1.1.68 Can it be
that a CEO engaged in accounting fraud or diversion of corporate assets should be
punished the same as a person distributing a half-kilo of heroin or seeking to entice
a minor over the internet?
61, Id. § 2BI.l.
62. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL sentencing tbl. (2007).
63. Id. § 2B1.1(b)(2)(C).
64. Id. § 2B1.I(b)(13)(B).
65. Id. § 5A.
66. Id.
67. Id. § 2G1.3.
68. Id. § 2D1.1.
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IV. RESTORING DISCRETION IN SENTENCING AFTER BOOKER
Newton's third law of physical motion is that for every action there is an equal and
opposite reaction.69 The Sarbanes-Oxley Act was an effort to rein in some of the
more aggressive practices in American business by strengthening the roles of vari-
ous gatekeepers-directors, accountants, and lawyers-and requiring corporations
to adopt much more stringent internal monitoring to ensure there would be no
more meltdowns like Enron and WorldCom. ° Any requirement that companies
institute greater internal controls entails significant costs, and there has been a
strong push to roll back certain parts of the Act because of the purported negative
effects on the capital markets in the United States.7'
The criticism has not been limited to the corporate governance provisions, with
questions being raised about whether corporations and their officers should be
prosecuted for what some term as business decisions." The message behind the
new criminal laws and increased sentences for corporate fraud in the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act was that corporate chieftains, once viewed perhaps as immune to crimi-
nal prosecution, should be the focal point of investigations and prosecutions.7"
Punishments akin to what drug dealers and child pornographers can receive be-
cause a distinct possibility for corporate executives. Whether a CEO should be
viewed as posing the same threat to society as a drug dealer is an open question.
While not strictly Newtonian in response, the Supreme Court's recent sentencing
jurisprudence creates the possibility of an opposing reaction to the increased pun-
ishments that the Sarbanes-Oxley Act authorized that may effectively change the
white collar crime sentencing atmospherics once again. The Sentencing Guidelines
deprived federal judges of most of the unfettered discretion they exercised until
1987 in sentencing defendants by requiring courts to apply a prescribed set of rules
to calculate a score that was then plugged into a grid to produce a narrow range for
a prison sentence.74 While not completely mechanical, it was a system that treated
the judges more as tellers or scriveners and less like dispensers of just punishments.
69. Sir Isaac Newton, Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy, in THE AGE OF REASON 108 (Louise L.
Snyder ed., 1955).
70. Lynn Stephens & Robert G. Schwartz, The Chilling Effect of Sarbanes-Oxley: Myth or Reality?, CPA J.,
June 2006, available at http://www.nysscpa.org/printversion/cpaj/2006/606/pl4.htm.
71. Sarah Johnson, Sarbox Rollback Report Due November 30, CFO.coM, Nov. 22, 2006, http://www.cfo.
com/printable/article.cfm/8313658/c-2984368?f=options. See generally COMM. ON CAP. MKTS. REG., THE COM-
PETITIVE POSITION OF THE U.S. PUBLIC EQUITY MARKET (Dec. 4, 2007).
72. See Larry E. Ribstein, Accountability and Responsibility in Corporate Governance, 81 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 1431, 1487 (2006) ("As concerns about the costs and effectiveness of criminal liability and the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act of 2002 increase, public demand may build for alternative accountability mechanisms." (citation
omitted)).
73. See, e.g., Ann Marie Tracey & Paul Fiorelli, Nothing Concentrates the Mind Like the Prospect of a Hang-
ing: The Criminalization of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 25 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 125, 131 (2004) (commenting on how
Sarbanes-Oxley laws are designed to provide prosecutors with the tools to prosecute those who would defraud
investors).
74. See generally Celesta A. Albonetti, Sentencing Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines: Effects of Defen-
dant Characteristics, Guilty Pleas, and Departures on Sentence Outcomes for Drug Offenses, 1991-1992, 31 LAW &
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In 2000, the Supreme Court's decision in Apprendi v. New Jersey' started a trend
toward restoring a measure of the discretion judges should have in sentencing when
a jury makes a limited decision on the defendant's guilt without detailed findings to
guide a court on what factors should go into the punishment.76 When the Court
held that the Guidelines were no longer mandatory in United States v. Booker," the
question simply became whether federal district judges would have real discretion
in sentencing, or whether the Guidelines still would be the dominant motif for
apportioning punishment.
In Gall v. United States,7" the Court made it clear that trial judges have the ulti-
mate control over sentencing, subject to limited appellate review.79 While the
Guidelines "should be the starting point and the initial benchmark" in a sentencing
decision, the judge "must make an individualized assessment based on the facts
presented."" Unlike the more mechanical Guidelines process, federal judges now
should "consider every convicted person as an individual and every case as a
unique study in the human failings that sometimes mitigate, sometimes magnify,
the crime and the punishment to ensue.""' Gall could not be clearer that the mech-
anistic force of the Guidelines are to be tempered, and perhaps even dissipated, by
the discretion of federal judges who can choose to follow-or ignore-them so
long as the decision is reasonably well explained. 2 After Gall, appellate courts are
to apply the abuse-of-discretion standard, an approach that affords trial judges
wide latitude to decide on appropriate sentences. s
The upward trend in sentencing since the Sarbanes-Oxley Act may abate, and
indeed perhaps even may be reversed due to the influence that Gall may have on
district courts. The recent sentencing of three former executives of Hollinger Inter-
national illustrates how lower sentences may become the norm in corporate fraud
cases.8 ' Lord Conrad Black, Hollinger's former CEO, and three others, Peter Atkin-
son, Jack Boultbee, and Mark Kipnis, were convicted in July 2007 for their roles in
diverting from the company funds related to the sale of assets under the guise of
Soc'y REV. 789 (1997) (noting that the Sentencing Guidelines were developed to remove judicial discretion in
sentencing).
75. 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
76. Id. at 497.
77. 543 U.S. 220, 245 (2005).
78. 128 S. Ct. 586 (2007).
79. Id. at 596-97.
80. Id. at 597.
81. Id. at 598 (quoting Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 113 (1996)).
82. Id. at 596-97.
83. Id. at 597. In explaining how the focus is on the sentence and not just the Guidelines, the Court stated,
"[i]f the sentence is within the Guidelines range, the appellate court may, but is not required to, apply a
presumption of reasonableness. But if the sentence is outside the Guidelines range, the court may not apply a
presumption of unreasonableness." Id. (citations omitted).
84. See Leonard N. Fleming & Abdon M. Pallasch, 6 1/2 Years, No Remorse; British Lord Headed to Prison
for Fraud After Lecture from Judge, CI. SUN-TIMES, Dec. 11, 2007, at 6.
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non-compete agreements." The recommended Guidelines sentences for Atkinson,
Boultbee, and Kipnis ranged from about three to almost five years, even using the
more favorable 2000 version of the Guidelines, based on a $6.1 million loss.86 But
the sentencing occurred the very day the Supreme Court announced its decision in
Gall, restoring significant discretion to district judges. 7 Rather than apply the
Guidelines' sentences, the court sentenced the defendants to twenty-four months
(Atkinson),"8 twenty-seven months (Boultbee),89 and probation (Kipnis).9" Only
Lord Black, the CEO, received a sentence within the recommended Guidelines
range at six and one-half years.9 Prior to Gall, I would have expected the judge to
adhere fairly closely to the Guidelines, and if a below-Guidelines sentence were
imposed, then I suspect the prosecutors would have appealed, particularly the grant
of probation. Now, it is unlikely that the government will take the time to appeal
these sentences because the chances of success are almost nil in light of the abuse of
discretion standard. These sentences indicate that federal judges can be expected to
use their discretion in sentencing, which in many cases will result in lower
sentences.
V. CONCLUSION
Gall may well be a harbinger of significant changes in the sentencing atmospherics
in corporate crime cases." The new criminal provisions adopted in the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act will remain, but they are largely meaningless given the broad array of
statutes that can be used to reach corporate misconduct. The Guidelines are now
truly advisory, and over time I suspect they will have less sway over federal judges,
who will use their new-found discretion to individualize sentences. That process of
focusing on the individual likely means sentences in white collar crime cases will
on the whole be lower in the future. White collar defendants are almost by nature
the type of appealing person who can sway a judge to be a bit more forgiving.
These defendants are, quite often, just like the judge in terms of social status, back-
ground, and interests. Moreover, they can often muster a large number of support-
ing letters to attest to their prior good works and upstanding community
reputation.93 These defendants are rarely recidivists, and pose virtually no threat to
85. Id.
86. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2FI.1(b)(1)(O) (2000) (recommending an increase of
fourteen levels for a loss of more than $5,000,000).
87. See Gall, 128 S. Ct. 586; see also Fleming & Pallasch, supra note 84, at 6.




92. See supra notes 52-55 and accompanying text.
93. David Louis Raybin, Letters of Support in Criminal Sentencing Hearings, TENN. B.J., July 2006, at 30.
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the safety of the community 94 -most would welcome them as neighbors and mem-
bers of the local community. So is this the beginning of the end of the pervasive
influence of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act on sentencing in corporate criminal cases?
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94. See Carl Emigholz, Utilitarianism, Retributivism and the White-Collar Drug Crime Sentencing Disparity:
Toward a Unified Theory of Enforcement, 58 RUTGERS L. REV. 583, 610 (2006) (commenting on how white
collar offenders are ordinarily good citizens in the community).
